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Abstract
M&A-transactions are often used by the top management for 
increasing their shareholder value for realizing identified syn-
ergy potentials of the target, like economies of scale and scopes. 
From a tax perspective they are interesting for the acquirer to 
reduce the group cash tax paid and the effective tax rate as 
well by using loss carry forwards of the target or utilizing the 
tax rate differences between the group entities. Simultaneously 
potential risk factors have to be captured early in the plan-
ning process to save the acquisition profit over all phases of an 
(m&a) transaction. In that context an important instrument is 
the so-called due diligence.
Actually empirical studies show that nearly 30 percent of all 
(m&a) transactions are not successful (Deloitte, 2012, p.27). 
Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that due diligence 
analyses could not be shaped efficiently as well. For improving 
and structuring the due diligence process, a holistic standard 
has not been established until now. 
The main goal of this article is to develop a risk oriented, 
mathematically based approach for the tax due diligence, which 
helps to improve the issues for planning, assessing and moni-
toring the anticipated acquisition profit of a transaction under 
consideration of specific tax conditions related to the target.
The proposed model can systematically capture tax risks 
within the framework of tax due diligence. That makes stand-
ardization of the tax due diligence process possible, which in 
turn makes adoption into a(n) (inter)national standard for con-
ducting due diligence activities. 
Keywords 
Auditing, Mergers & Acquisitions, Corporate Governance, 
Corporate Taxation, efficient audit methods
1 Nature of the problem
After a period of stagnation during the financial and eco-
nomic crisis, the market for corporate takeovers has recently 
stabilized again in Germany (Spanninger, 2011, p.50). For the 
management of the acquiring company there may be a cer-
tain pressure to show positive performance, to invest avail-
able liquidity as profitably as possible, and to assert itself in 
the market instead of becoming itself a target for acquisition. 
The increasing number of court cases dealing with corporate 
decision-making in case of loss situations further amplifies that 
effect (Graumann and Grundei, 2011, p.380). In that context 
an important instrument is the so-called due diligence (Beisel 
and Klumpp, 2009). It grants the acquirer access to sensitive 
information about the object to be acquired, for the purpose of 
being able to conduct a comprehensive audit. In that regard, 
due diligence has some important functions. Firstly, it serves 
to uncover risks of various natures and helps in the decision-
making process in terms of shaping the agreement and finding a 
realistic price for the acquisition, because it allows for a better 
assessment of the target object. The slighting of asymmetries 
of information may be seen as a direct effect of due diligence. 
Moreover, due diligence can be said to have an absolving effect 
with regard to the due care that the management of a corpora-
tion must exercise when making decisions in the capacity of 
acquirers (OLG Oldenburg, 2006, p.66). That is particularly the 
case in respect of perusing the planning information and finan-
cial numbers of the target of the purchase.
Additionally, due diligence ensures that information starts 
flowing at an early stage between the target object and the 
acquirer, which is of significant importance for integration (Aus-
tmann, 2009, p.283). Both those functions have an indirect effect 
on acquisitions. To be in a position to make an assessment of the 
integration effort and to draw up a first plan for the purpose of 
effectively reaching the target, due diligence must lead to uncov-
ering significant risks that are inherent in the object. They must 
be suitably documented and shall lead the acquirer to identify 
starting points for the future integration. From an economic point 
of view, those due diligence targets must, of course, be reached 
in a cost-effective manner (Wöhe and Döring, 2010, p.341). 
1 University of Hamburg, Department of Taxation, 
Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
2 University of Hamburg, Institute for Auditing and Tax Management, 
Max-Brauer-Allee 60, 22765 Hamburg, Germany
* Corresponding author, e-mail: andreas.mammen@wiso.uni-hamburg.de
23(1), pp. 41-50, 2015
DOI: 10.3311/PPso.7968
Creative Commons Attribution b
research article
P Periodica Polytechnica
Social and Management 
Sciences
42 Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci. V. Endert, A. Mammen
Therefore, as far as due diligence is concerned, it must be ana-
lyzed which possibilities exist for enhancing efficiency.
Various functional subsections can be distinguished in due 
diligence (Berens and Strauch, 2010, pp.12), which may vary 
according to intensity and specifics of the transaction (sector, 
type of transaction, etc.). However, it can be fundamentally 
said that inspecting balance sheets and financing (financial due 
diligence), taxes (tax due diligence), the legal framework (legal 
due diligence), the corporate strategy and the market environ-
ment (strategy & market due diligence), staff (human resources 
due diligence) and the organization (organizational due dili-
gence) is done regularly. Building upon that structure, further 
inspections may be conducted if required, such as doing an 
analysis of environmental risks (environmental due diligence) 
and of corporate culture (cultural due diligence) (Blöcher and 
Glaum, 2005; Berens and Strauch, 2002, p.62).
Tax due diligence has its own importance, for two reasons. 
Firstly, tax risks often present significant hindrances for trans-
actions (Gerber and König, 2009, p.59). Uncovering tax risks 
must be of special interest to the management of the corpora-
tion. Secondly, contrary to other fields of due diligence, tax law 
is subject to frequent, dynamical changes (Hey, 2002, p.75) and 
puts rather complex demands on the inspection. It may not only 
have to deal with significantly different past, current and future 
tax regimes, but, in the case of international concern structures, 
it also has to take the tax requirements of other countries into 
account. Therefore, efficient inspecting and auditing is of para-
mount importance in the tax arena.
In order to determine whether there is potential for enhancing 
the quality of tax due diligence, the current status of research 
will first be examined hereafter (Chapter 2). Subsequently, the 
risk-oriented audit approach will be theoretically and methodi-
cally imposed on tax due diligence (Chapter 3). Core items 
of this contribution are the implications for tax due diligence 
that may become clear as well the uncovering of possible criti-
cal points. The contribution concludes with a summary of the 
results of the research (Chapter 4).
2 Current status of researching tax due diligence
2.1 Processes and quality of due diligence in general
Within the meaning of the deal economy, an M&A transac-
tion is considered to be advantageous if the anticipated sub-
jective idea of the acquirer in terms of the value of the target 
object over the entire M&A process exceeds the price that has 
been paid for the target object (Beyer and Castedello, 2010, 
p.37). From a tax perspective, the economic advantage of an 
M&A transaction depends on
•	 the potential tax risks and opportunities of the targeted 
transaction that are identified during the transaction stage,
•	 the costs that are incurred on account of conducting the 
due diligence itself, as well as
•	 the tax savings that may be realized when consuming the 
target transaction, minus the requisite restructuring costs 
that are incurred during the integration stage. The latter 
are determined by the extent of pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition measures (Gröger, 2010, pp.549 & pp.552).
All costs must be included in this consideration that are nec-
essary for complete integration of the target company into the 
acquiring undertaking. That may perhaps need to include the 
costs for setting up a tax risk management system and / or the 
cost that may need to be incurred for adapting to the risks man-
agement system that already exists in the acquiring organization. 
To be able to sufficiently assess and plan, the tax subsystems of 
the target object must be analyzed as early as possible (Cui and 
Zhang, 2011, p.395). Thus, the success of an M&A transaction 
is to a decisive extent determined by the efficiency and quality 
of the due diligence inspection process and therefore demands a 
concept that is based on scientific points of view.
That requires firstly deciding on what ‘quality’ actually 
means. A due diligence inspection must be quite separate from 
the annual audit, because it is less profound (Hogh, 2010a, p.3). 
Nonetheless, the due diligence inspection is an economic audit 
that “typically” belongs to the scope of an auditor within the 
meaning of Articles 2, Paragraph 1, and 2, WPO (Wirtschaft-
sprüferordnung (Auditors Ordinance)). The scope of a due dili-
gence differs from that of an annual audit. That being said, it is 
still possible to apply the term ‘audit quality’, because it must 
also cover the uniformly understood quality assurance of finan-
cial auditors in terms of all activities of the auditor – including 
due diligence inspections (Lück, 2000, p.1).
A generally accepted definition of quality does not exist 
in business administration (Niehus, 2002). Rather, the term 
should be defined on the basis of the underlying purpose 
(Bonner, 2008, p.3 & p.26). In principle, audit quality may be 
understood to be the entirety of all characteristics in terms of 
audit activity (Niehus, 2002; Cahan et al., 2011, p.860) that 
enables the auditor to uncover deviations from the standard 
and irregularities in the target of the audit (DeAngelo, 1981, 
p.186). Those characteristics (Fig. 1) may be subdivided into 
characteristics that come together within the person doing the 
auditing (notably experience, professional qualifications, etc.) 
and in characteristics that are enshrined in specific professional 
standards (especially audit standards that must be adhered to) 
(Orth, 2007, p.1101; Manita and Elommal, 2010, p.89).
There is a lot of literature about approaches to measuring audit 
quality (Bonner, 2008, p.30; Marten, 1999, p.148). To be able to 
measure something, dimensions must be allocated in advance to 
the measuring variables (Saint-Mont, 2011, p.23). The quality 
will depend on the dimensions that have been defined. Amongst 
others, they may be derived from theoretical knowledge of 
decision theory, adherence to professional standards or from the 
relationship between consumption of resources, such as time 
and / or costs (Bonner, 2008, p.30). Same as quality assurance, 
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a “peer review” in accordance with Article 57a, WPO, is often 
conducted in professional audit practice, in which the work of 
the auditor is verified by another, independent auditors (Mar-
ten et al., 2011, pp.541-571; Herkendell, 2007, pp.165-168). 
Accordingly, the approach is assessed as dimension against the 
professional standards for auditors, because in that respect they 
reflect compliance with professional and technical standards 
that are accepted as being of high quality.
However, currently no concept of professional standards 
exists for carrying out due diligence. As such, it remains to be 
seen to what extent high quality auditing can be assured with-
out there being any standards. In fact, enhancement of quality 
could already be achieved by codifying professional stand-
ards (Niehus, 2002). On the one hand it would result in setting 
scales for assessing and measuring quality. On the other hand, 
it would open up the possibility of applying uniform qual-
ity assurance, for example within the framework of the qual-
ity control that must be carried out as per Article 57a, WPO. 
Therefore, the fitness of transferring the various dimensions to 
(tax) due diligence would have to follow suit.
2.2 Possibilities and limitations with regard to tax 
due diligence
With regard to tax due diligence there are problems in estab-
lishing one or more inspection standards because of the continu-
ously increasing complexity and the frequency of changes that 
occur in (inter)national tax law (Hey, 2002, pp.69-76). Because 
of the globalization bringing more and more intertwining of 
international organizations (Börsig, 2008, pp.618-624), there 
are all the more points of contact between different jurisdic-
tions. The missing and / or insufficient harmonization of tax law 
is the reason for the divergence of legal arrangements and con-
sequently attaches a multi-dimensional aspect to the research 
into it. The multi-dimensionality emanates from the differences 
in legal arrangements in the countries where the object of the 
purchase is domiciled, bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
between countries (especially double taxation agreements 
respectively the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union) (Lühn, 2009, p. 271) and national peculiarities and dif-
ferences in legal treatment during past assessment periods. Con-
sequently, from an audit-technical point of view, the inspection 
is rather complex (v. Wysocki, 1998, p.120).
The aforementioned facts trigger the question why, in the liter-
ature, there are no deliberations on reducing the complexity and 
/ or planning of inspections. Instead, it is often recommended to 
uncover tax risks within the framework of tax due diligence with 
the aid of check-lists (Sinewe and Oelsner, 2010, p.22). Though 
apart from that there is sometimes a comprehensive presentation 
of different tax areas and possible sources of risk are shown as 
examples (Hogh, 2010b, pp.30-42). A critical remark in this con-
nection is whether such an approach can be consistent with the 
objective of efficiency, whilst it is just as hard to categorically 
capture and prevent redundancies and obsolete audit practices 
as is avoiding not carrying out necessary audit tasks (so-called 
“under-auditing”) (Mochty, 1997, p.733). Though check-lists 
may be used within the framework of audits, it does not make 
the planning of an audit at meta-level possible. Additionally, 
check-lists harbor the danger that positions will be captured that, 
because of their universality respectively the particular acquisi-
tion situation, are of rather insignificant or subordinate impor-
tance for the buying organization (Berens et al., 2011, p.119). 
Whilst codification of standards may also be possible in other 
areas of due diligence, the problem of an inefficient inspection 
because of the high frequency of changes in tax law must be con-
sidered to be especially grave. Elaborating general standards in 
the field of tax due diligence therefore carries special importance.
Features of the deployed 
Person (auditor)
Qualitay as characteristic feature
↓ ↓
e.g.
• Suitability as person
• Experience
• (Preparatory) training
• etc.
Features in terms
of professional
requirements
↓ ↓
Professional pre-
requisites
Compliance with
standards and
announcements
e.g.
• Independence
• Conscientiousness
• Personal responsibility
• Confidentiality
• Impartiality
• etc.
e.g.
• ISA
• IDW announcements
• DRS
• etc.
Fig. 1 Profiling of audit quality
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With regard to tax due diligence, Löffler demanded as long 
ago as 2004 an independent framework concept in the form of 
an inspection standard (Löffler, 2004, pp.637). Hitherto, noth-
ing the like has been established, neither nationally nor inter-
nationally. As already put on the table, such a standard would 
have a decisively positive influence on the quality of a tax due 
diligence inspection (Niehus, 2002). Such standards should 
encompass a closed framework concept that should also make 
an economically efficient and, for reasons of the due care that is 
required in identifying tax risks, effective inspectionplanning of 
tax due diligence possible. Standards that exist for annual audits 
are based on the risk-oriented audit approach. As such, it should 
first be clarified whether the approach may also serve as starting 
point for setting standards for tax due diligence. Therefore, in 
the following it will be analyzed which findings of the annual 
audit can also be sensibly applied to tax due diligence.
3 Developing a risk-oriented inspection approach to 
tax due diligence
3.1 Suitability of the risk-oriented audit approach for 
due diligence
Tax due diligence is an economic inspection that incorpo-
rates giving advice on tax elements and falls within the scope of 
an auditor. There are numerous activities during an annual audit 
that must also be carried out during a due diligence inspection, 
which require coordination for reasons of efficiency (Pollanz, 
1997, p.1354), even though the scope of an annual audit is usu-
ally much wider than the scope of a due diligence inspection 
(Hogh, 2010a, p.3). Because the inspection within the frame-
work of tax due diligence is carried out by order of a private 
party and not because it is legally required, there are important 
differences to an annual audit, which must be adequately taken 
into consideration.
Although hitherto no uniform and comprehensive inspection 
theory has been established, various theoretical approaches 
to providing a basis for the inspection exist (Ewert, 2007, 
pp.1119). With regard to planning the inspection, the so-called 
audit risk model has gained prevalence, both nationally (IDW, 
2012) and internationally (AICPA, 1984). It defines the audit 
risk (AR) as the probability that an auditor will accept an audit 
area as correct, in spite of materially false statements being 
made. The audit risk is the multiplicative linking of inherent 
risk (IR), control risk (CR) and detection risk (DR). The inher-
ent risk describes the probability of the occurrence of signifi-
cant errors in the annual accounts, the control risk describes the 
probability of internal audit of the organization failing to detect 
such errors and the detection risk describes the probability of 
the auditor failing to detect significant false statements in the 
annual accounts (AICPA, 1984). Theoretically, the audit risk 
model can be presented as follows (Marten et al., 2011, p.208):
AR IR CR DR= ⋅ ⋅�
Although in part there have been further developments in this 
field of science (Baetge et al., 2011, pp.129-136), the model has 
remained virtually unchanged in its recognition since its incep-
tion. New findings make the case for stronger linking between 
the inherent and control risks (IAASB, 2009).
But independence of the two components continues to be 
possible (Ruhnke, 2007, p.157). In practice, the model is not 
used for assessing the probabilities item by item. Rather, the 
probabilities are captured as bandwidths (Wolz, 2003, pp.296-
348). In its practical application, the model contributes to 
determine the extent of audit procedures necessary to assess the 
orderliness of the annual accounts (Stibi, 1995, pp.123-135).
For that, the basic equation (Eq. 1) must be adapted for the 
detection risk, because it is the only variable that can be influ-
enced by the auditor (Marten et al., 2011, p. 210). The result is:
DR AR
IR CR
=
⋅
�
�
� �
Although the maximum acceptable audit risk (AR) is given, 
the inherent (IR) and control (CR) risks must be estimated by 
the auditor on the basis of the results of the preliminary audit. 
The required scope of random checks is derived from detection 
risk that has been determined in that way (Stibi, 1995, pp.133).
The core idea of the risk audit model is the concept of the 
sufficiency of certainty that must be applied to the annual audit 
(Orth and Eisenhardt, 2009). Neglecting insignificant errors 
within the framework of an annual audit is justified from an 
economic point of view, because a complete inspection cannot 
be brought in harmony with the principle of efficiency (Marten 
et al., 2011, p.207). By focusing on risk-bearing audit targets, 
an effective and efficient audit is guaranteed.
Due diligence must also follow those points of view. Espe-
cially the aspect of efficiency must be brought to prominence, 
because it is one of the obligations of due care of an orderly and 
conscientious businessman (Krieger and Sailer-Coceani, 2010). 
Analogous to an audit of annual accounts, tax due diligence is 
also a complex inspection, because numerous entrepreneurial 
interdependencies of the target object form the subject of the 
inspection in a dynamic (legal) environment. Accordingly, a 
complete audit should be avoided under the principle of effi-
ciency. Rather, the management of the acquiring organiza-
tion should be directed towards focusing on the essential risks 
(OLG Oldenburg, 2006, p.66). Taking the significant overlap-
ping of requirements and deployment possibilities of both tasks 
into account, in principle, the risk-oriented audit approach can 
also be applied to the tax due diligence inspection. Albeit that 
the remaining differences require modification.
3.2 Modification of the risk-oriented audit approach
If audit risk (AR) is first looked at, it should logically be 
transformed into the maximal residual tax risk that can be toler-
ated by the principal. In respect of the framework conditions of 
(1)
(2)
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the deal economy that have already been described, the term 
‘tax risk’ can be defined as unplanned additional payments that 
must be made by the acquirer, which, therefore, he must include 
in his calculations. Such additional payments may become 
necessary in relation to the purchased object itself, within the 
framework of a so-called “share deal”, as well as when taking 
over packages of tangible assets within the framework of a so-
called “asset deal”(such as on the basis of tax liability regula-
tions like Articles 73 and 75, general tax code (AO), or also 
Article 25, Commercial Code) (Haun and Stelzer, 2009, p.514). 
As financial means dissipate, the advantageousness of buying 
the enterprise may well take a turn for the worse for the acquirer. 
Therefore, there is a relationship between the tolerable addi-
tional payments of the acquirer and the maximum price that he 
may be willing to pay for the object to be purchased (expected 
value (EV)) and the actually agreed target price (TP). The dif-
ference between both components (acquisition profit (AP)) sets 
the basis for determining the maximum risk that can be tolerated 
by the acquirer (tax due diligence risk (TDDR)), measured as a 
percentage of the purchase price:
AP EV TP= − ∈ +with AP 
as well as
TDDR EV TP
TP
TDDR= − ∈ +with 
*
If the total of the difference between the actually paid pur-
chase price and the maximum amount of the acquirer for addi-
tional tax payments is used up, it could be that there will be 
no financial advantageousness. In an extreme situation, the 
potential “acquisition profit” may be fully consumed by the 
existing tax risks. In a further step, the principal must therefore 
determine which share of economic advantageousness (AP) 
he may be willing to forgo as a possibly liable debtor within 
the meaning of Article 191, Paragraph 1, juncto Articles 73, 
74 and 75, AO, as well as other tax liability standards under 
individual items of tax legislation and / or liability standards 
under commercial law and in the form of costs for due dili-
gence inspections. In this respect this part reflects the percent-
age share of the tax risks that have not been discovered within 
the framework of the due diligence inspection. Accordingly, 
the economic advantageousness is broken down into:
(1 φ) reflects the percentage share of the discovered tax risks 
that may possibly be recognized in the form of a correspond-
ing reduction in the purchase price. To this extent the full risk 
compensation through the reduction in the purchase price and 
the expected economic advantageousness remains, under ideal 
circumstances, constant in the result. But in reality it must still 
be noted that it is exactly the enforceability of risk compensa-
tion that is to a significant extent determined by the competi-
tive situation in the tender procedure. That situation might be 
captured by adding a further probability factor.
Thus, the expected tax due diligence risk [E(TDDR)] is 
determined as follows, whilst taking the risk appetite of the 
principal into account:
E TDDR
EV TP
TP
( ) = −( ) ⋅ ∈ < ≤+
ϕ
ϕ ϕwith [ ]R* 0 1
The inspection risk is made up of the components inherent 
risk, control risk and detection risk. When transferring to the 
field of tax due diligence, inherent risk (IR) is equal to case-
specific tax risk (scope-related risk (SRR)) that is attached to 
the organization because of, amongst others, its legal form, its 
economic engagement, and the legal framework of the sector. 
This reflects the fundamental tax risks that reside in the object 
of the purchase. Furthermore, control risk consists of the com-
bined control risk of the types of taxes under consideration 
(combined control risk (CCR)), which is based on the systems 
in relation to the single type of tax that exist within the com-
pany. Finally, detection risk (DR) is fully transferable, without 
limitation, to the tax due diligence inspection and merely dif-
fers from the audit risk model of the annual audit as far as the 
object of the inspection is concerned. The resulting equation 
for the risk-oriented tax due diligence inspection model is:
TDDR SRR CCR DR= ⋅ ⋅
The TDDR component is specified by the acquirer through 
E(TDDR). Equating the formulas (5) and (6) results in:
EV TP
TP
SRR CCR DR
−( ) ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
�
� � �
ϕ
Fundamentally, the limit price of the acquirer cannot be set 
precisely, but only in the form of a bandwidth (Matschke and 
Brösel, 2006, p.113). It depends on the alternative investment 
opportunities of the acquirer (Sieben and Schildbach, 1994, pp. 
24-28), the possible synergy effects and economies of scale 
(Meckl and Riedel, 2011, p.378) and on the existing environ-
ment (especially market conditions) and is, at least in theory, a 
fixed value. Against that, the price that is actually paid depends 
on the limit price of the acquirer as well as of the vendor 
(4)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(7)
φ
(undected risk potential)
AP (Acquisition Profit)
↓ ↓
(1−φ)
(dected risk potential)
↓
(1−φ) * δ
(max inspection costs)
Fig. 2 AP (Acquisition Profit)
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(resultant agreement range) and the negotiation position and 
flair of both parties (Münch, 2010, p.219). In order to optimize 
those values, against the background of the retroactive impact 
of detected tax risks on the purchase price, those values should 
initially be laid down as provisional estimated values, for exam-
ple through planning calculations and multiples (Coenenberg 
and Schultze, 2002, pp.699). That will then give consideration 
to the fact that the tax due diligence risk symbolizes the actual 
situation after due diligence has been carried out, notwithstand-
ing that it must be laid down in advance.
3.3 Optimizing due diligence from the point of view 
of the acquirer
The case-specific tax risk must be estimated by the auditor 
within the framework of the preliminary inspection, as must 
the combined control risk. Also the inspection program must 
be derived from that inspection. Accordingly, the detection 
risk is once again the only variable that can be influenced by 
the auditor, so that formula (6) will be determined as per the 
detection risk of the scope of the inspection activities in rela-
tion to the statement:
DR
E TDDR
SRR CCR
=
( )
⋅
�
�
Applying the equation (5) results in:
DR
EV TP
TP
SRR CCR
DR
EV TP
TP SRR CCR
DR
EV TP
=
−( ) ⋅
⋅
⇔ =
−( ) ⋅
⋅
⋅
⇔ =
−( ) ⋅
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
1
TP SRR CCR� ⋅ ⋅
It must be taken into consideration that a minimum scope 
of inspection actions or, respectively, a maximum detection 
risk exists on account of the existing information asymmetry 
between vendor and acquirer in relation to the existing tax risk 
and the concomitant uncertainty as well the retroactive impact 
of detected tax risk on the purchase price that is to be paid from 
the point of view of the acquirer, which may not be exceeded. 
For every other detection risk that is mitigated, more inspec-
tion actions will be required and the costs of tax due diligence 
will be higher, which in turn will have direct influence on the 
advantageousness of the transaction. Assuming that the tax due 
diligence inspection is done by a third party, which is quite com-
mon in practice (Sinewe and Oelsner, 2010, p.19), the cost func-
tion (K[x]) may, in principle, be taken linearly (Coenenberg et 
al., 2013, p.68). It consists of a component of fixed costs that the 
acquirer must be for initiate the tax due diligence without carry-
ing out specific inspection activities (for example, for drawing 
up the agreement, accepting the order, administrative expenses, 
etc.) and of a variable component that depends on the scope 
of the inspection activities that must be carried out in terms of 
hours (x) at the hourly rate (k). The result is:
K x F k x( ) = + ⋅�
Albeit the cost function being linear, such a conjunction does 
not exist between the detected risks and the inspection actions 
that have been carried out respectively the hours that have been 
worked. Initially, it must be assumed that the number of existing 
(potential) tax risks in the object that is to be bought is limited. 
Otherwise there could be additional tax payments at unlimited 
levels. Therefore, from the point of view of the acquirer, reduc-
ing the detection risk is only advantageous, if the costs of the 
additional inspection activities are more than compensated by 
the tax risks detected and by the appurtenant price reduction.
In analogy to the audit risk model, a non-linear conjunction 
between the quantity of tax risks and the additional tax pay-
ments in connection with the relevant risk and reducing risk 
detection, when carrying out additional inspection activities, 
must be assumed. That permits the optimal degree of detection 
risk to be determined. Specifically, the following conjunctions 
apply to this assumption:
•	 The first inspection activities lead to the fast detection 
of tax risks.
•	 The more inspection activities are carried out, the less 
financial impact will detected tax risk have.
•	 If eventually all existing risks have been detected, 
meaningfully increasing the inspection activities is no 
longer possible.
•	 Risks that are detected first will have a higher potential for 
damage and therefore lead to a greater reduction in price 
than subsequently detected risks. That is a result of the risk-
orientation of planning the inspection, which first leads to 
the detection of the potential additional tax payments that 
have a high probability of them actually occurring.
Therefore it yields a production function in which the num-
ber of hours of the inspection is explained by various influence 
variables that reflect the case-specific tax risk and the combined 
control risk. Similarly to producing audits of annual accounts 
(Koch and Wüstemann, 2012, pp.509-511; Hackenbrack and 
Knechel, 1997, p.485; Banker et al., 2003, pp.258-260), the 
output of worked hours (x) can be determined through the fol-
lowing formula:
ln nlx y
k
K
k( ) = + ( ) +⋅
=
∑β β ε0
1
In relation to the audit of the annual accounts, the possible 
influential factors (y) are, for example, the sector, the size and 
the existing intertwining of the organization (number of affili-
ates respectively parent companies), the possession ratios, the 
scope and effectiveness of existing internal control systems 
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
47Improving the Acquisition Profit  2015 23 1
and perhaps advance knowledge of the particular auditor. But 
other than in the case of auditing the annual accounts, for a tax 
due diligence exercise the principal determines the scope of the 
inspection. As instrument for providing information, this scope 
must fundamentally be determined from a cost-benefit point of 
view, even under the aspect of management responsibility in 
capital corporations (BGH, 2011, p.752). On the one hand, the 
benefit of the acquirer (utility, U (x)) depends on the tax risks 
(Tax Risks, δ
TR
) that already exist in the object to be bought. 
Firstly, the acquirer can mitigate existing uncertainties and 
asymmetries in information through due diligence and make a 
purchase decision on a sure basis. Secondly, the awareness of 
existing tax risks can be used to reduce the purchase price dur-
ing possible later negotiations.
On the other hand, those positive aspects must be juxtaposed 
to the costs of the tax due diligence inspection. Although the 
due diligence inspection must be conducted under legal liabil-
ity points of view, the principal can nonetheless determine the 
scope himself. Accordingly, the optimum must depend on the 
personal risk appetite of the principal. The benefits will follow 
from the costs (negative contribution to benefits), the possible 
negotiation cards emanating from detection of risks (positive 
contribution to benefits) as well as knowledge of the detected 
risks themselves, because they influence the decision of the 
acquirer in the light of his risk appetite. In analogy to determin-
ing the scope of the inspection, the utility function also takes 
account of the number of hours worked by the auditor. Because 
this is a decision with uncertainties, a Bernoulli utility function 
may be used (Laux et al., 2012, p.109). Forced by legal liability 
when conducting a tax due diligence inspection, a minimum 
scope would have to be ensured (OLG Oldenburg, 2006, p.66). 
That minimum inspection scope is represented hereafter by 
the costs of global and detailed planning of the detection risk 
that must be contained under legal liability aspects. The costs 
have altogether a fixed character. On the assumption that there 
will be no variable costs in this case, because no inspection 
activities need to be carried out, the benefits should in this case 
match the costs and therefore be zero. It leads to the following 
general form of the risk utility function:
U x e K xTR
x( ) = + + −( ) − ( )( )⋅ − ⋅( )ln 1 1F δ α
In utility functions as per Eq. (11), the aspects that have 
been touched upon earlier, will be adequately taken into con-
sideration. It contains first the existing tax risks (δ
TR
). Fur-
thermore, the e-function presupposes that with an increasing 
number of invested hours, the monetary value of detected tax 
risks will reduce. If it is assumed that only a finite number of 
tax risks exists in the organization and the risk-oriented audit 
approach is applied, the risks with high monetary values would 
be detected first, but further inspection activities would have a 
falling limit value. By applying the logarithmical function, a 
preference of the decision-maker for mitigating risks is taken 
into consideration. The individual degree of risk aversion is 
captured in variable α here. Though, in principle, the risk util-
ity function presupposes the decision-maker to be risk-averse, 
it is actually just right for capital corporations (Nell and Rich-
ter, 1996, pp.240-242). However, the degree of risk aversion 
may vary individually. The more pronounced the risk aversion 
is, the more closely does α approach the value zero. Applying 
formulas (11) and (12) and assuming that ε = 0 will yield:
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Equation (13) demonstrates that fixed costs are not so impor-
tant any more, to the extent that they arise anyway for the pur-
pose of avoiding liability. In case that there really exist no tax 
risks in the object to be purchased, there will not be any inspec-
tion activities either, because that determination can already be 
assessed by the auditor within the framework of accepting the 
order. An example from real life might be a share deal that has 
been subjected to external auditing on every reporting date during 
all relevant past assessment periods with relevance to legal lia-
bility and for which the initial tax assessments have not changed, 
respectively the amendment decision in accordance with Article 
164, Paragraph 3, Sub 3, AO, juncto Article 120, Paragraph 1, 
AO, does not contain further secondary stipulations. In this case, 
a change in the tax assessment would only be possible in the 
case of tax evasion or careless underpayment of tax (blocking of 
changes as per Article 173, Paragraph 2, Sub 1, AO). In this case, 
the benefits from the tax due diligence inspection are:
U Fx e K xTR
x( ) = + + ⋅ −( ) − ( )( )− ⋅( )ln 1 1δ α
If, on the other hand, tax risks do exist, it may make sense to 
expand the inspection activities if the detected tax risks exceed 
the costs. Observation of the limit value of Eq. (13) yields:
lim ln ln
x TR
x
TRe k x→∞
− ⋅( )+ ⋅ −( ) − ⋅( ) = + −∞( )1 1 1δ δα
Although the function for a negative value range has not 
been defined, it can be seen that the optimal permissible degree 
of detection from the point of view of the acquirer depends 
on the one hand on the cost function of the provider of the 
tax due diligence service and on the other hand on two own 
utility function in relation to the tax due diligence inspection.
(12)
(14)
(13)
(15)
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The function can take various courses here, the course of the 
tax risks that exist in the object to be purchased, the course of 
the variable costs and the course of the efficiency of carrying 
out the inspection exercise. Whilst the course of the cost func-
tion is linear, the course of the utility function depends on the 
existing tax risks and the permissible number of hours.
Figure 2 shows two possible courses. Both utility functions 
initially show strongly rising benefits that arise as a result of 
the first inspection activities. After that, the rate of increase 
flattens and falls as soon as the costs of additional inspection 
activities are lower than the additionally detected tax risks. 
The risk utility function U1(x) reflects a more risk-amenable 
decision-maker vis-à-vis risk utility function U2(x). Whilst 
decision-maker U1(x) reaches its maximum benefits already 
after only few hours of work on inspection activities, the ben-
efits of decision-maker U2(x) continue to rise steadily. There-
fore, U2(x) would prefer a greater inspection scope and a 
lower tax due diligence risk than U1(x).
Fig. 3 Possible course of costs and utility functions.
An optimum may be determined on the basis of the first 
derivation:
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Because of the negative exponents of the internal derivation 
for the logarithmical function, the equation can only be solved 
approximately, for example through applying the so-called 
Newton method (Schaback and Wendland, 2005, pp.107-119; 
Huckle and Schneider, 2006, pp.239-248). The empirical esti-
mation of Eq. (12) can therefore be taken as the initial starting 
point for deriving the inspection program. The exact scope is 
determined by the risk preferences of the principal.
3.4 Implications and limitations
of the model approach
The proposed model can systematically capture tax risks 
within the framework of tax due diligence. That makes 
standardization of the tax due diligence process possible, which 
in turn makes adoption into a(n) (inter)national standard for 
conducting due diligence activities possible. By falling back on 
the risk-oriented audit approach that is recognized in practice, 
its use will be facilitated. From the point of view of the due 
diligence service provider, some training costs can perhaps be 
avoided, because the existing model is already known to the 
staff (Ruhnke, 2007, p.156). It does, however, provide a first 
approach for closing the identified gap in research on theoreti-
cal foundations that are close to actual practice.
But it remains to be seen to which extent the existing criti-
cisms of the risk-oriented audit approach will also be applica-
ble to the risk-oriented tax due diligence inspection model. The 
first criticism is the deficient independence of the individual 
components (Marten et al., 2011, p.212), which is, however, 
no mandatory precondition for applying the inspection model 
(Stibi, 1995, pp.143-146).
A further criticism is the subjectivity and deficient accuracy 
of the estimations of the risk components (Wiedmann, 2006, 
p.1946). But against that, it can be said that disclosing subjec-
tive probabilities will expose contradictions and effects of scale 
by making use of existing expertise, which would be particu-
larly applicable to tax due diligence.
Further criticisms, such as deficient completeness because 
of overestimating existing risks (so-called α risks in auditing 
annual accounts), the deficient certainty because of simplifica-
tion and the missing weighting of the risk components (Mar-
ten et al., 2011, p.214) cannot be fully applied to the model. 
For example, weighting according to types of tax or possible 
causes of liability might be possible in the tax arena. Moreo-
ver, those criticisms have, in practice, not led to rejection of 
the risk-oriented audit approach (Baetge et al., 2011, p.127). In 
respect of the deficient completeness it could additionally be 
said that the minimum inspection scope for tax due diligence 
is already specified by the economic framework conditions, as 
has been demonstrated.
In respect of tax due diligence, the deficient need for such 
an inspection could indeed be established by contractually 
excluding tax risks, for example in the form of tax clauses. 
But such agreements (Trimborn, 2010, pp.443) do not bring 
about a shifting of the material tax debt, but rather do embody 
a claim, purely under civil law (Mammen and Sassen, 2011, 
p.832). Accordingly, fulfillments of those claims depend to a 
decisive extent on the creditworthiness and dependability of 
the acquirer (Dobler and Lambert, 2011, p.122).
On top of that, enforceability in other countries is doubtful 
(Dix and Zwiener, 2010, p.473). Proceedings before the courts 
are, in any case, less certain than taking the risks into account 
that have been determined in advance within the framework 
of the purchase agreement. Therefore, tax due diligence is an 
indispensable instrument for the acquirer in respect of securing 
risks and sets the first step on the road to successful integration 
(16)
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of the object of the purchase into the acquiring organization 
or related companies and thereby to a sustainable increase in 
shareholder value (Meckl and Riedel, 2011, p.380).
4 Conclusions and further research needed
In the contribution at hand it was possible to demonstrate that 
transferring the risk-oriented audit approach to tax due diligence 
is possible and makes sense. Moreover, this model provides a 
first approach for closing the gap in research with regard to 
standardization of the tax due diligence process. For that pur-
pose, the risk components must be modified and the findings 
from the deal economy must be integrated, so that efficient use 
of this model can be ensured. Existing criticisms hardly limit 
the advantages of using it. There are further areas of use beyond 
applying the model in tax due diligence. For example, such a 
concept could be used in formulating renovation concepts, so 
that they can be systematically prepared for tax optimizing. 
This would enhance the quality of tax due diligence. Based on 
the given risk appetite (risk level) by the principal, the model 
provides a basis for exculpation within the framework of legal 
disputes for those charged with carrying out the due diligence. 
The model also provides the person charged with carrying out 
the inspection with a structured concept for doing so.
At first sight, there would be a need for future research into 
system auditing and the combined control risk. In order to ena-
ble the integration of the tax process into the entrepreneurial 
subsystem, the structure and design of those systems must be 
sufficiently well known. And then, systems for identifying tax 
risks hardly exist. Therefore, further research will be needed 
into the shaping of the inspection activities that must be carried 
out, so that the whole matter can become more efficient. Espe-
cially, attention should be paid to the development and efficient 
deployment of analytical inspection activities in the tax arena, 
with the aim of optimizing the substance of the scope of the 
inspections as well as its costs. Finally, testing in practice and 
therefore verification of the empirical results is still required. 
The model at hand offers first starting points and can serve as 
basis for such deliberations.
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